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If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It
Kathryn Judge*
A prescription is only as good as the diagnosis on which it is
based. This is just as true in finance as it is in medicine. And, in Hal
Scott's assessment, the reforms adopted in the wake of the 2007-09
financial crisis ("Crisis") are based on a fundamental misunderstanding
of the reasons for that crisis. The future is accordingly bleak.
In his thorough and thoughtful new book, CONNECTEDNESS AND
CONTAGION: PROTECTING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM PANICS (2016),

Hal Scott argues that the reforms underway are based on the faulty
assumption that interconnectedness was the primary problem giving
rise to the Crisis. Scott refutes this view by providing the richest
account to date of the myriad vectors through which the failure of
Lehman Brothers may have contributed to weaknesses at other
financial institutions and the knock-on effects that would have been
triggered had AIG also been allowed to fail. Having convincingly
established that the actual losses arising from Lehman's failure were
insufficient to explain the magnitude of the fallout that followed, Scott
argues that the panic that ensued must instead be the product of
"indiscriminate" runs, which he equates with contagion.' The answer
for contagion is a robust lender of last resort, ideally coupled with the
option of crisis-time guarantees. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (the "Dodd-Frank Act") moved the needle
in the wrong direction on both fronts, while adopting an array of other
reforms that tackle the largely illusory connectedness problem. As a
result, we are less prepared to deal with the next crisis than we were to
deal with the last one.
The exquisitely detailed, institutionally sensitive treatment of
its subjects are what make this book an important contribution to the
already sizeable corpus of work on the Crisis. That this type of
treatment is required to establish some of the points that Scott seeks to
convey, however, also weakens some of his core claims. For example, in
collecting information from the bankruptcy proceedings and numerous
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other sources that detail Lehman's actual exposures to other financial
firms and the hedging undertaken by those firms that reduced their
effective exposure to Lehman, Scott does succeed in showing that the
actual exposures were generally modest. 2 By systematically identifying
the major markets in which Lehman was active and the financial
ramifications of its failure on those markets, Scott also provides insight
into the operations of the tri-party repo market, money market mutual
funds, and an array of other market structures that were central to the
Crisis and yet remain beyond the comprehension of most. The very need
to review such a wealth of material, however, also casts doubt on the
notion that anyone could have known as much as Scott knows today at
the time that Lehman failed. This is all the more true given the failure
of the Federal Reserve and other financial policymakers to make a
meaningful effort to better understand these dynamics prior to
Lehman's failure, despite the warning signs and authority that could
have been used to that end. 3
More to the point, the runs that occurred throughout the Crisis
were not nearly as "indiscriminate" as Scott suggests. They were
widespread and included runs on institutions that we know, with the
benefit of hindsight, to have been relatively well capitalized. But there
was also remarkable and meaningful heterogeneity in the decisions
short-term creditors made about what investments to exit and when. 4
When viewed in light of the distinct incentives of money claimants, as
opposed to other types of investors, they may be as readily explained by
a lack of meaningful information as by coordination problems or
hysteria.5 This does not undermine his normative claims, but it leaves
unexplored a more nuanced analysis of the relationship between why
money claimants fled and how best to stop the bleeding when the next
crisis hits. Paying too little heed to information, as known and
knowable, in real-time during the Crisis also results in a failure to
address other tools that might further the very crisis-management aims
that Scott highlights as critical.6
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None of these qualms detract from Scott's core insight. The most
important lesson in CONNECTEDNESS AND CONTAGION: PROTECTING
THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM PANICS rests on a platitude that is even

more banal than a faulty diagnosis: if it ain't broke, don't fix it. As great
as the Great Recession was, it would have been far worse had financial
policymakers failed to respond aggressively following the failure of
Lehman Brothers. Legislators have stripped financial regulators of the
very tools that proved most effective in containing the Crisis and may
yet scale them back further. Scott sounds a much-needed alarm bell.
We can only hope that he is heard.
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